US Army War College

USAWC Press
Monographs, Books, & Publications
6-1-2016

Honduras: A Pariah State, or Innovative Solutions to Organized
Crime Deserving U.S. Support?
R. Evan Ellis Dr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs

Recommended Citation
R. Evan Ellis Dr., Honduras: A Pariah State, or Innovative Solutions to Organized Crime Deserving U.S.
Support? ( US Army War College Press, 2016),
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/422

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Monographs, Books, & Publications by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.

The United States Army War College
The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service
at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application
of Landpower.
The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates
who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers. Concurrently,
it is our duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a “think factory” for commanders
and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage
in discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving
national security objectives.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national
security and strategic research and analysis to influence
policy debate and bridge the gap between military
and academia.

CENTER for
STRATEGIC
LEADERSHIP

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

The Center for Strategic Leadership contributes
to the education of world class senior leaders,
develops expert knowledge, and provides solutions
to strategic Army issues affecting the national
security community.
The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
provides subject matter expertise, technical review,
and writing expertise to agencies that develop stability
operations concepts and doctrines.
The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic
leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom
grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and
by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in
the analysis, evaluation, and refinement of professional
expertise in war, strategy, operations, national security,
resource management, and responsible command.
The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center acquires,
conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use
to support the U.S. Army, educate an international
audience, and honor Soldiers—past and present.

i

STRATEGIC
STUDIES
INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War
College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related
to national security and military strategy with emphasis on
geostrategic analysis.
The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct
strategic studies that develop policy recommendations on:
• Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined
employment of military forces;
• Regional strategic appraisals;
• The nature of land warfare;
• Matters affecting the Army’s future;
• The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and,
• Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.
Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern
topics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of
Defense, and the larger national security community.
In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics
of special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings
of conferences and topically oriented roundtables, expanded trip
reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders.
The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the
Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army
participation in national security policy formulation.
iii

Strategic Studies Institute
and
U.S. Army War College Press

HONDURAS: A PARIAH STATE, OR
INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS TO ORGANIZED
CRIME DESERVING U.S. SUPPORT?

R. Evan Ellis
June 2016

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.
Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and
U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full
academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified
information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent
official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to
offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for
public release; distribution is unlimited.
*****
This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code,
Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be
copyrighted.

v

*****
Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should
be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S.
Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn
Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010.
*****
All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War
College (USAWC) Press publications may be downloaded
free of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of certain
reports may also be obtained free of charge while supplies last
by placing an order on the SSI website. Check the website for
availability. SSI publications may be quoted or reprinted in
part or in full with permission and appropriate credit given
to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army
War College Press, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA. Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address:
www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.
*****
The Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War
College Press publishes a monthly email newsletter to update
the national security community on the research of our analysts,
recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides
a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you
are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the
SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter.

ISBN 1-58487-723-5

vi

FOREWORD
For the U.S. Armed Forces, and militaries throughout the world, non-traditional missions have become
an increasingly important part of the range of operations that they are called on to conduct. In the Western Hemisphere, one of the most prominent examples
has been the involvement of Central American armed
forces in the fight against transnational organized
crime groups and violent street gangs such as Mara
Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18 (B-18). The longterm propriety of employing the military in what is,
at its core, a law enforcement role, continues to be
a subject of debate not only in Central America, but
also throughout Latin America and the Caribbean,
and elsewhere in the world. Nonetheless, in the face
of the inadequacy of law enforcement institutions to
meet the challenge, because of its magnitude, lack of
resources, corruption, and other shortcomings in law
enforcement institutions, elected leaders across the
ideological spectrum in Honduras, as well as neighboring El Salvador and Nicaragua, have consistently
assigned their armed forces prominent roles in combating these challenges.
Perhaps the most extreme of such cases has been
Honduras, where the military has not only been
used to augment law enforcement capabilities, but in
which the administration of President Juan Orlando
Hernandez has created a new elite police force within
the armed forces, the Military Police for Public Order
(PMOP), as well as a creative structure for integrating
military and police units, prosecutors, special judges,
and other government assets within the National Interagency Security Force (FUSINA), under the President and his national security council.
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While President Hernandez himself has been the
target of national protests over allegations of corruption and abuse of power, the new security structures
that he has put in place and their application via Plan
Morazán have produced significant results, including
a reduction in the nation’s murder rate from 86.5 per
100,000 in 2011, to 64 per 100,000 by 2014. With help
from the United States, Honduras has significantly reduced the use of its national territory as a transit zone
by narcotraffickers and has dismantled the leadership
of the two most important drug smuggling organizations operating in the region, the Cachiros and the
Los Valles.
The present monograph by Latin America research
professor Dr. R. Evan Ellis of the Strategic Studies
Institute (SSI) examines the policies and strategies
of the Hernandez administration in the fight against
organized crime and gangs in Honduras, both with
respect to its innovations and achievements, as well
as its shortcomings, as a case study of an important
mission that armed forces in the region are increasingly called upon to perform. The monograph also
provides concrete recommendations for U.S. military
leaders and policymakers with respect to effectively
engaging with Honduras in the struggle against the
shared threats of organized crime and gangs.
This monograph is the latest in an ongoing series of works by SSI to provide strategic-level insight for U.S. military leaders, as well as policymakers and academics, on important security and
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defense issues in Latin America and the Caribbean. We hope that you find it stimulating and of
interest.

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
The public protests against Honduran President
Juan Orlando Hernandez, which peaked in July 2015,
highlighted perceptions of corruption by Hondurans
of their President and his government, and fostered
a new spirit of civic participation in Central America. Outside the region, less noticed is that President
Hernandez has also made significant changes in the
strategy and institutions of the country in combating the interrelated scourges of organized crime and
violent gangs, which have plagued Honduras as well
as its neighbors. That new approach, set forth in the
administration’s interagency security plan and Operation MORAZÁN, has produced notable successes.
With U.S. assistance, the National Interagency Security Force (FUSINA) and the Honduran government
dismantled the leadership of the nation’s two principal family-based drug smuggling organizations, the
Cachiros and the Los Valles, and significantly reduced
the use of the national territory as a drug transit zone,
particularly narco flights. Murders in the country have
fallen from 86.5 per 100,000 in 2011, to 64 per 100,000
in 2014.
The approach taken by the Hernandez administration to produce these results includes the creation of
innovative new structures. These include a new military-led interagency organization, FUSINA, which integrates elements from the armed forces, police, prosecutors, special judges, and other state resources to
combat organized crime and delinquency in the country. More controversially, he has created a new police
force within the military, the Military Police of Public Order (PMOP), which has been deployed both to
provide security to the nation’s principal urban areas,
Tegucigalpa, Comayagüela, and San Pedro Sula, and
xiii

to participate in operations against organized crime
groups. In the fight against narcotrafficking, he has
advanced a concept of three interdependent “shields”:
1. An air shield to better control Honduran airspace, enacted in January 2014, which enables
suspected drug flights to be shot-down and the
acquisition of three radars from Israel to support intercepts by the Honduran air force;
2. A maritime shield, with new naval bases on the
country’s eastern coast and new shallow-water
and riverine assets for intercepting smugglers;
and,
3. A land shield, including enhanced control of
the border with Guatemala through the “MayaChorti Task Force.”
Beyond FUSINA, the Hernandez administration
has also sought to reform the nation’s national police,
albeit with slow progress. It is also reforming the penitentiary system, dominated by the criminal gangs MS13 and B-18.
In the implementation of its new approach, the
Hernandez administration has also faced a number
of difficult challenges. These include persistently
high levels of corruption at all levels of government,
a substantial presence of organized crime in the private sector, slow police reform, institutional rivalries
between government organizations, difficulties with
the integration of intelligence capabilities supporting
FUSINA, difficulties in combating money laundering,
societal concerns regarding human rights violations
by the military and other government entities, and the
long-term hurdle of a changing culture of gangs, violence and poverty that permeates the country.
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This monograph focuses on the evolution of the
transnational organized crime and gang challenges
in Honduras, the strategies and structures of the Hernandez administration in combating them, associated
challenges, and recommendations for the U.S. military and policymakers to support the country in such
efforts.
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HONDURAS: A PARIAH STATE, OR
INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS TO ORGANIZED
CRIME DESERVING U.S. SUPPORT?
INTRODUCTION
In July 2015, tens of thousands of Hondurans
turned out in the streets of the nation’s principal cities,
Tegucigalpa, Comayagüela, and San Pedro Sula for
recurring weekly protests against the government of
President Juan Orlando Hernandez, which many saw
as corrupt and going beyond democratic mechanisms
to exercise and consolidate its power.1 Key protest issues included a scandal involving the nation’s principal state health organization, the Honduran Institute
for Social Security (IHSS), in which government payments for false or substandard medicines may have
resulted in the deaths of ill and elderly Hondurans,
while part of the illicit gains went to the nation’s leading politicians, including the President’s own electoral
campaign.2 For many, however, the last straw was
the April 2015 ruling by Honduras’ Supreme Court
to overturn the nation’s constitutional prohibition of
re-election.3 Many in the country saw the decision as
orchestrated by President Hernandez to sustain himself in power. This decision was viewed by many as
being related to other actions by Hernandez that some
in Honduras found questionable, such as when he, as
head of Congress, played a key role in the removal of
four Supreme Court justices supporting ex-President
Manuel Zelaya.4
While the allegations of corruption and abuse of
power by opponents of President Hernandez are serious, they also contrast dramatically with evidence
that the Hernandez administration has made significant progress in combating organized crime and inse1

curity in Honduras. In less than two years, murders in
Honduras were reduced from 86.5 per 100,000 in 2011,
to 64 per 100,000 in 2014, in a country that was previously the most violent in the region.5 By the estimate
of the Honduran government, shipments of drugs
via air have declined 98%,6 an achievement publicly
corroborated by U.S. authorities,7 and a significant accomplishment for a country through which 80% of all
U.S.-bound cocaine once passed.8
These successes of the Honduran government,
largely overshadowed by the political scandals noted
in the previous paragraphs, are fundamentally important not only for the country, but also for its neighbors, the region, and the United States. The 2014 immigration crisis, in which an estimated 60,000 Central
American children arrived at the U.S. southern border, attempting to enter the United States, forced the
Obama administration to dedicate $3.7 billion in one
month9 to deal with a humanitarian crisis coming from
three countries that collectively had received only $1.2
billion in U.S. aid since 2008.10 Moreover, while the solutions adopted by the Hernandez government have
shortcomings and raise concerns from the perspective
of democratic governance, they also contain innovative elements and have produced achievements that
will serve as a reference for other states in the region
with similar challenges.
Beyond the region itself, a full and nuanced understanding of the achievements and shortcomings of
the security initiatives of the Hernandez government
in Honduras is important for the U.S. government
as it makes decisions regarding how, and to what
degree, to continue to support Honduras in its fight
against transnational organized crime, violence and
insecurity.
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While a significant amount has been written in
both the Latin American and U.S. media regarding
organized crime, gangs, and the political challenges
faced by the Hernandez administration, there has
been a relative absence of detailed academic work
published in English regarding the security challenges
facing Honduras, and the initiatives of the Hernandez
administration for addressing them. This monograph
is designed to help fill that void.
Methodology.
This monograph examines the state of security
challenges in Honduras, with a focus on street gangs
and transnational organized crime. It reviews the
principal security policies, relevant government structures, and initiatives of the Hernandez government to
combat those challenges, followed by an examination
in greater detail of key difficulties or areas of contention associated with that struggle, then concludes
with a series of recommendations for U.S. policymakers to support Honduras’ fight against the challenges
of gangs and transnational organized crime.
This work employs a qualitative approach, based
on in-person, telephone, and email interactions by the
author with officials and academics in the Honduras’
defense, security, and law enforcement sectors, including 17 in-depth interviews conducted in Tegucigalpa
during July 2015, supplemented by the review and application where appropriate of English and Spanishlanguage documents, news accounts, and secondary
sources.
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The Honduran Security Challenge.
For more than 40 years, Honduras has been an
important transit country for narcotics flowing from
“source zone” countries in South America, such as Colombia and Peru, to the United States.11 In the 1970s,
Honduran drug trafficker Juan Ramon Matta leveraged the country’s strategic geographic position as a
“bridge” moving the cocaine of Pablo Escobar’s Medellin Cartel in Columbia to the Guadalajara Cartel in
Mexico.12
The same strategic geography also placed Honduras in arguably the most hotly contested part of the
Western Hemisphere during the Cold War. During
this period, Honduras’ neighbors on all sides (Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala) were involved in
civil wars with spill-over effects into Honduras, even
though Honduras itself managed to avoid an internal
conflict.
Beyond drugs and civil wars, the geography of
Honduras has also prejudiced it with respect to hurricanes, tropical storms, and other natural disasters.
More than 30 hurricanes have impacted the country
since 1950, including Hurricanes Fifi and Mitch, the
latter causing an estimated $2 billion in direct damages when it struck the country in 1998, leaving an
estimated 20% of the country’s population homeless.13
Finally, Honduras’ strategic location has contributed to it being one of the countries of the region most
beset by gang violence, together with neighboring
Guatemala and El Salvador. The gang presence centers
on, but is not exclusive to, two groups: Barrio 18 (B-18)
and Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), each of which has its
origin in Central American immigration to the United States during the region’s civil wars in the 1980s.
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Many settled in the greater Los Angeles area, with
Central American youth giving birth to both street
gangs there. The subsequent deportation of thousands
of undocumented Central American immigrants with
criminal records beginning in 200014 transplanted the
new gangs to the region, where they quickly spread.
The security situation in Honduras has particularly degenerated during the last 15 years as a product
of the interaction between gangs, drug traffickers, immigration, and weak institutions. As B-18 and MS-13
took root in Honduras and fought to displace rival
gangs and each other, the resulting violence increased
outbound emigration, already high because of the
lack of economic opportunities in the country. Such
immigration split up families, leaving more Honduran youth without two-parent family structures in
violent neighborhoods, vulnerable to recruitment by
the gangs.
With respect to narcotrafficking, family-based
Honduran criminal smuggling groups such as the
Cachiros and the Los Valles moved drugs through the
region, generally financed by Mexico-based cartels
and other groups. They found a readily available labor
force to help it to do so, particularly in isolated rural
areas with few other economic opportunities, such as
the Departments (geographical divisions) of Copan,
Olancho, and Gracias a Dios. Their ability to move
drugs was further facilitated by a police force and political class which had come to be compromised at the
highest levels by money from transnational organized
crime, contributing to a dysfunctional judicial system
in which impunity approached 100%, particularly for
actions involving protected major criminal groups.
The growing crisis of governability in Honduras from the interaction of gangs and narcotrafficking deepened even further in 2009 when Honduran
5

President Mel Zelaya was ousted from power in an
irregular process, which many within the country,
and in the regime, saw as a violation of Honduras’
democratic principles.15 Whether or not the ouster of
President Zelaya was defensible within the nation’s
laws and constitutional framework, it caused the international community, particularly in the Americas,
to isolate the Honduran government,16 including a
cut-off of most U.S. security assistance.17 In the resulting breach, Mexican cartels significantly ramped up
the use of Honduran territory for U.S.-bound narcotics shipments.18
By the outset of the Hernandez administration, the
movement of drugs through Honduras had come to
be dominated by two family-based clans: the Cachiros
(the Rivera Maradiaga brothers) and the Los Valles, although both subsequently suffered grave blows at the
hands of both the Honduran government and U.S. law
enforcement.
The Cachiros, whose origins involved smuggling,
including cattle, operated principally in the inaccessible and sparsely-populated eastern portion of the
country, in Departments such as Atlántida, Olancho,
Colon, and Gracias a Dios. As the use of the country as
an air bridge to the United States grew during the period of Honduras’ international isolation, the Cachiros
dominated such operations.
During this period, the Cachiros and other groups
also brought significant quantities of drugs into the
country by sea, initially moving much of the product
along Honduras’ rugged, inaccessible coastline, taking advantage of the lack of government presence
there. Drugs brought in both by air and by sea were
also commonly transferred to trucks, cars, motorcycles, and people for movement overland to the border with Guatemala.
6

Behind the scenes, the Honduran government,
with the support of the United States and other international law enforcement organizations, was working
to take down such networks. These efforts culminated
in an important victory in January 2015 when the two
top leaders of the Cachiros, Javier Eriberto and Devis
Leonel Rivera Maradiaga, both fled to the Bahamas,
where they turned themselves in to U.S. authorities.19
By contrast to the Cachiros, the Los Valles operated
principally in the Department of Copan, in the west
of Honduras along the border with Guatemala. Their
strategic geographic position allowed them to control
drug flows moving west from the Atlantic coast of
Honduras, as well as from El Salvador, in the south,
moving toward the Guatemalan border. Los Vallesaffiliated smugglers reportedly controlled property
on both sides of the (then poorly supervised) Honduras-Guatemalan border which they reportedly operated as their own private “customs houses” for narcotics and other contraband passing across, en route to
Mexico and the United States.
Both the Los Valles and Cachiros enjoyed strong
relationships to the Honduran political class, as illustrated by the case of Jose Miguel “Chepe” Handal,
who reportedly purchased cocaine from the Los Valles
on behalf of interests in Guatemala.20 In doing so,
Handal reportedly enjoyed protection as the cousin of
Arístides Mejía, the Minister of Defense under previous Honduran President Manuel Zelaya
The two principal heads of the Los Valles organization, Miguel Arnulfo and Luis Alonso Valle Valle,
were arrested and extradited to the United States in
October 2014.21
In addition to the two principal transporter groups,
a number of other smaller drug smuggling organiza-
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tions also operated in Honduras, with varying levels
of affiliation with, or subordination to, the Cachiros and
Los Valles. These included groups such as the “Olancho
Cartel” (reportedly operated by the Saramiento family), the “South Valley” cartel (operating in Choluteca,
the strategic point where Nicaragua, Honduras, and
El Salvador converge in the Gulf of Fonseca), and the
“AA Brothers” organization. They also included the
group “14e,” a shadowy umbrella organization, rumored to coordinate the efforts of the 14 leading families in San Pedro Sula involved in narcotrafficking.
With the exception of the 14e, such groups are not
so much independent cartels as organizations that
subcontract to, or are affiliated with, the Los Valles
or Cachiros, and which have grown and have taken a
measure of independence as those two groups have
been progressively dismantled during the course of
2014 and 2015.
Even these smaller groups are in a state of flux.
For example, members of the Saramiento family were
reported to have fled to Nicaragua following actions
against the Olancho Cartel in July 2015,22 while cartel
boss and mayor of the village of El Paraiso, Alexander
Ardon, and his AA Cartel have reportedly become a
focus of the Honduran authorities.23
As noted previously, the use of aircraft, vis-à-vis
boats, to bring drugs into Honduras (particularly to
the Atlantic coast), fell off with U.S. re-engagement
with the country, as well as with the increased Honduran state presence since 2010, particularly in the
sparsely populated eastern region of the country.
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In addition, narcotraffickers continue to apply
creativity and substantial resources to find new ways
to conceal drug shipments, including the use of submarines. Although Honduran authorities reportedly
do not intercept such vessels frequently, persons interviewed for this monograph mentioned rumors of
such vehicles sunk off the northern Honduran coast in
the area of Islas de Bahia, near the island of Roatan.24
Finally, transportation of drugs overland is often
part of drug smuggling, including movement by car,
commercial vehicle, motorcycle, and foot traffic. Shipments brought into the country by aircraft and boats
are moved by such means across the country, generally to the Guatemalan border as part of their larger
journey toward the United States. To do so, smugglers
use a broad range of techniques to conceal their cargo;
from hidden compartments in cars and trucks, to artificial breast implants, to planting cocaine in the intestines of cows.
In such operations, local labor has played an important role in offloading incoming narcotics-carrying
aircraft and ships, storing drugs until such time as it
is believed that security and market conditions make
opportune their movement to their next destination,
and physically transporting the drugs when that time
comes.25
In general, Mexican groups such as the Sinaloa
Cartel and the Zetas, contracted for and partially financed the movement of drugs across the country.
Yet such groups generally did not operate directly in
Honduras.
Honduran narcotics experts that were consulted
for this monograph generally viewed the Mexican cartels as maintaining a distant and pragmatic posture
with respect to narcotraffickers in the country. The
cartels would frequently shift between the groups
9

they contracted with for drug shipments as the situation of those groups in the country evolved. Indeed,
in the face of occasional robberies of drug shipments
(tumbes), the cartels reportedly bought back the stolen drugs from the organizations that hijacked them,
regarding it as a cost of business.
As previously noted, Mexican cartels have generally not operated in Honduras directly, however, the
cartels and leaders have played an important role in
the country and continue to maintain relationships
with Honduran traffickers. The most famous example is Joaquim “El Chapo” Guzman, leader of Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel, who reportedly spent time in the
principal compound of Los Valles in the village of El
Paraiso.26
The influence of the Mexican cartels is also reportedly strong in Choluteca, Honduras’ principal outlet
to the Pacific coast, where the South Valley cartel of
Orlando Pinto Espino operates.
While opinions differ regarding the presence in
Honduras of Mexico’s newly emergent cartel Jalisco
Nuevo Generación, those interviewed for this monograph generally believed that they were operating
in the country. Some even suggested that they were
involved in operations in the Department of Yoro,
which potentially serves as a geographical bridge between the Atlantic coastal provinces and the border
with Guatemala.
With respect to the Zetas, who came to exercise considerable influence in neighboring Guatemala during
the 2008-2011 period,27 although the group reportedly
has a presence in Honduras,28 those consulted for this
monograph believed that its influence in the country
was declining.
Finally, with the previously noted dismantling of
the leadership of Honduras’ narcotrafficking orga10

nizations, the Cachiros and Los Valles, some Mexican
cartels may now be taking a more active role in the
country, reaching out to the smaller cartels and others
to build new networks for transporting drugs through
Honduran territory. The Honduran newspaper El
Heraldo, for example, reported an alleged meeting between members of Mexico’s Juarez Cartel and ranchers
in Olancho to discuss such support activities.29
Beyond the movement of drugs across the country, authorities have found some evidence that, since
2013, criminal organizations have been processing
drugs in laboratories in Honduras.30 The first of such
laboratories was uncovered in 2011 in the Merendon
mountain area, near the border with Guatemala.31 The
second was found approximately 40 kilometers from
La Ceiba, and the third was discovered in the vicinity
of the village of Omoa, also close to the border with
Guatemala.32
Rumors have also circulated that coca plants may
be grown in the northern Department of Yola, although to date, authorities have not uncovered specific evidence that this is occurring.
Beyond cocaine, Honduran narcotics experts consulted for this monograph suggested that synthetic
drugs such as methamphetamines are being produced
in the country. In one case, 13.6 tons of pseudoephedrine, a precursor chemical used in the production of
methamphetamines, was reportedly found in San
Pedro Sula. The chemicals (the largest quantity ever
found in one place in the region), were said to be
linked to narcotrafficking operations of the Ramirez
Corria brothers. The extent of synthetic drug production in Honduras is unknown, in part because Honduran authorities reportedly lack capabilities, such as
trained police chemists, to effectively investigate such
activities.
11

Gangs.
With respect to gangs, as in other northern triangle
countries, the two principal groups in the country are
Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18 (B-18). The two
are similar in strength, sophistication, and activities
in Honduras, although B-18 is believed to have more
members in Honduras, when measured by the number of each gang in Honduran prisons, and reportedly
tends to be more violent.
The gangs are generally concentrated in the country’s major urban areas; Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula,
and to a lesser extent, La Ceiba. B-18 is reportedly
more dominant in Tegucigalpa, while MS-13 is more
powerful in San Pedro Sula. La Ceiba is principally
populated by smaller gangs, including Los Grillos and
Los Colocho.
B-18 and MS-13 also have a limited presence in
smaller towns, such as Roatan and El Paraiso. There
has also been some dispersion of gang members into
the countryside. In response to anti-gang legislation
passed in 2001, some gang members began to migrate
to rural areas, although in recent years, according to
those consulted for this monograph, they have mostly
reconsolidated in urban zones.
The situation of B-18 and MS-13 in Honduras is
somewhat different from that in other Central American countries. In Honduras, the leadership structures
of the gangs are more diffuse, and by contrast to El
Salvador, a smaller percentage of their leaders are in
prison. Nor has the split in B-18 between the Revolucionarios and Surenos factions, manifested in neighboring
El Salvador, been replicated in Honduras.
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The truce temporarily achieved between B-18, MS13, and four smaller gangs in El Salvador in 2012,33
gave rise to an attempt by Honduran Bishop Romulo
Emiliani to achieve a similar pact between the gangs
in Honduras.34 By 2013, it was clear that such attempts
had failed.35
By contrast to other Central American countries,
in recent years, new smaller street gangs have also appeared in Honduras, including Los Chirizos,36 El Combo
que no se dejan,37 and Los Benjamin,38 each local to Tegucigalpa and generally focused on extortion.
With respect to the origins of the smaller gangs, the
first two emerged from an extortion group led by the
mafia figure El Gato Negro, who both extorted and protected merchants in the public market of Tegucigalpa
from B-18 and MS-13. El Gato Negro was eventually
assassinated (reportedly by police with whom he had
previously collaborated in the extortion racket), paving the way for the emergence of Los Chorizos and Los
Combo Que No Se Dejan as groups who had previously
worked for him.
The criminal activities of the gangs in Honduras
have generally been focused on extortion, and to a
lesser degree, distributing and selling drugs in the
urban areas that they control. In addition, the gangs
serve as assassins for transporters and other organized
crime groups.
Such groups also earn some revenue from extorting immigrants along routes to the United States.
Within B-18 and MS-13, there is reportedly some specialization, where some “clicas” (the smallest unit of
gang members) earn revenue as assassins, versus others that focus more exclusively on extortion and other
crimes.
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Those interviewed for this monograph emphasized the adaptability and quality of constant change
of both the gang and narcotrafficking organizations in
Honduras.
To some degree, as the two established gangs have
aged, they have also become more “corporate,” coming to own transportation companies, bars and discos,
as well as providing security for their own operations
while extorting their competitors.
The current generation of gang members also generally does not use tattoos, or uses small tattoos on
concealed parts of their body. This change in behavior
from the previous generation of B-18 and MS-13 in El
Salvador appears to be an adaptation to anti-gang legislation passed in 2001 and modified in 2015,39 as well
as the targeting of gang members by Honduran law
enforcement, and to some extent, the social stigma of
gang membership.
The gangs have also evolved as organizations. Reflecting the need to manage their substantial revenue
streams, B-18 and MS-13 have sent members to schools
to study skills useful to their organizations, including
law and accounting.40 They have also reportedly sent
members to infiltrate police academies, and to a lesser
extent, the military.41
With growing revenues, some senior gang leaders,
referred to in some circles as “master homies,” have
come to resemble successful businessmen, living in
well protected neighborhoods, driving fine cars, and
otherwise enjoying affluent lifestyles.
The gangs in Honduras are also evolving their activities and tactics, driven not only by the actions of
authorities, but also popular culture. One law enforcement expert interviewed in Tegucigalpa for this monograph noted, for example, that in the months follow-
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ing the broadcast of the television drama “Cartel de los
Zapos” (a dramatization of the exploits of Colombian
drug kingpin Pablo Escobar), the use of motorcycles
to commit assassinations in the streets of Tegucigalpa
(a tactic highlighted by the show) experienced a significant surge in Honduras, prompting the National
Assembly to pass a law prohibiting the carrying of
passengers on motorcycles.42
Honduras’ New Initiatives to Combat Organized
Crime and Insecurity.
With the election of Porfirio Lobo in November
2009, and in recognition of the dramatic expansion
in narcotrafficking activity that occurred in the country during its period of isolation by the international
community following the ouster of President Manuel
Zelaya, the United States began to re-engage with
Honduras in the security domain in important, albeit
limited ways.
On the Honduran side, President Lobo took important actions during his presidency to re-engage with
the United States and combat organized crime and delinquency. An oversight body for investigating police
corruption was created and the military was given the
authorization to support the national police. A new
Honduran national security council was established,
as well as a constitutional reform permitting extradition to the United States. Lastly, a major counter-organized crime initiative, “Operation LIGHTNING”43
was launched. One key to Lobo’s success with such
new initiatives under difficult circumstances was his
strong relationship with then head of the National
Congress (subsequently elected President) Juan Orlando Hernandez, who helped to craft many of the
initiatives and secured their passage in the Congress.
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While not widely appreciated outside of Honduras,
the scope of changes in laws related to public security
in Honduras under President Lobo, and subsequently
President Hernandez, is impressive. Former Interior
Minister and head of the non-governmental Centro de
Documentation de Honduras (Documentation Center of
Honduras [CEDOH]) catalogs 34 separate laws which
have been passed since 2010 regarding security and
defense matters.44
Since assuming office, President Juan Orlando
Hernandez has relied heavily (albeit not exclusively)
on the Honduran military, reflecting his conviction,
shared by many in the country, that in the near term,
the national police and other instruments of government have been too thoroughly penetrated by criminal elements to be effective.45
According to senior Hondurans knowledgeable of
the President who were interviewed for this monograph, Hernandez’s disposition to use the military as
his primary tool for combating organized crime has
roots in his past experiences. Hernandez attended a
conservative military academy in San Pedro Sula in
his youth and reportedly has a particularly close personal relationship to Amilcar Hernandez, one of his
16 brothers, who was a well-respected officer in the
Honduran military before his career was cut short by
an accident during a military parachute jump.
To date, the cornerstone of President Hernandez’s
approach to combating organized crime in Honduras
has been the creation of an operational-level interagency task force to execute operations against transnational organized crime and insecurity in the country. The task force, Fuerza de Seguridad Interinstitucional
Nacional (National Interagency Task Force [FUSINA])
was planned and officially established upon the President’s January 2014 inauguration.
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Although the organization was compared by persons interviewed for this monograph to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in actuality,
FUSINA is narrower and more operational in its orientation than DHS. Nonetheless, its significance as a
creative and ambitious structure, wrestling with the
inter-institutional challenges of the fight against organized crime and delinquency in Honduras is no less
ambitious, and no less filled with challenges.
Although officially, FUSINA was created by President Hernandez, the organization also reflects intellectual inputs from the nation’s key military leaders,
including commander-in-chief of the Honduran
armed forces General Freddy Santiago Díaz Zelaya, as
well as Colonel Gustavo Adolfo Paz Escalante, who
became FUSINA’s first director.
National Interagency Task Force (FUSINA).
FUSINA operates under the authority of the Honduran National Security Council, created by Hernandez’s predecessor, Pepe Lobo. It includes the
President, the President of the National Congress, the
President of the Supreme Court, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Presidency, the Minister of
Defense, the Minister of Public Security, and the head
of the Honduran Joint Chiefs of Staff. While, for use in
this role, the National Security Council and its members are specified in the Honduran constitution, not
all Presidents have made use of the council as actively
as President Hernandez has.
Although FUSINA is not specified in the framework of the Honduran constitution, the government
characterizes FUSINA as the “operational arm” of the
National Security Council, particularly in matters of
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combating organized crime and insecurity. The members of the National Security Council provide oversight of FUSINA, particularly the Minister of Defense
and Minister of National Security, and are reportedly
consulted when FUSINA executes operations against
high-impact personalities, such as major narcotraffickers or political figures. Nonetheless, the day-to-day
activities of FUSINA are managed by the colonel-level
military officer, currently Gustavo Paz, who heads the
organization.46
The guide for the activities of FUSINA is the President’s “Interagency National Security Plan,” adopted
upon his assumption of office. The plan addresses
both FUSINA and its primary mission, “Operation
MORAZÁN.”47 By contrast to previously conducted
interagency operations of more limited scope, such
as Operation LIBERTAD,48 Operation MORAZÁN
contemplates operations by FUSINA against criminal
organizations and insecurity in the entirety of the national territory.
Operation MORAZÁN includes four phases:
1. Configuration and Dissuasion, realized during President Hernandez’s first two months
in office, during which time key structures to
implement the new plan, including the Military
Police of Public Order (PMOP), were set up;
2. Taking the Initiative, officially spanning from
January through May 2014, during which time
the major operations contemplated under the
plan were launched;
3. Domination, from May 2014 through January
2016, during which time the newly established
security structures are envisioned to substantially re-establish order in the country; and,
4. Stabilization and Transition, from January
2016 through January 2018, during which time
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the new security organizations are anticipated
to “consolidate their successes” and importantly, return control to civil authorities.49
From the name “Operation MORAZÁN,” to the
use of terms such as “domination,” the plan reflects
its military roots. While such language (to be “dominated”) presumably refers to organized crime rather
than civil society, the choice of words highlights the
differences in attitudes between the Honduran armed
forces and other parts of civil society.
With respect to the establishment of FUSINA as
the key organization for implementing Operation
MORAZÁN, the organization has been assigned part,
but not all, of the assets of the armed forces and national police, as well as judicial investigators and judges.
Other elements of the armed forces and resources of
the Honduran government are reportedly available to
be assigned to FUSINA on short notice, when needed.
Although as noted previously, the head of FUSINA is a military officer, its second in command is
an officer of the National Police. In addition, reflecting FUSINA’s intra-institutional character, the other
agencies contributing resources are included on its
managing executive board, facilitating access to those
organizations for operational issues.
The entirety of the newly created PMOP (discussed later in greater detail) is assigned to FUSINA,
as well as the elite paramilitary police force, the Tigres.
With respect to Honduran Army, Navy, and Air Force
units, as of July 2015, FUSINA had 6,300 members of
the armed forces under its jurisdiction, including over
3,000 members of PMOP, and approximately half of
Honduras’ naval assets.50
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Other Honduran government organizations that
could potentially play a role in the fight against gangs
and criminal organizations, available to be tasked by
FUSINA, include the nation’s principal counter-drug
agency, the Dirección de la Lucha Contra Narcotráfico (Directorate for Combating Drug Trafficking [DLCN]).51
Organizationally, below the level of senior leadership, FUSINA is divided into 18 intra-institutional
task forces, generally organized by the Departments
of Honduras (for budgetary, as well as operational
reasons). Special additional task forces, such as MayaChorti, whose mission is to control illicit flows (including people and contraband as well as drugs) along the
border with Guatemala, are also included as distinct
entities within the FUSINA command structure.
Replicating the organization at the national level,
each task force is co-led by a military officer and an
officer of the National Police, and generally includes
some military and police personnel, at least one investigator from the “public ministry,”52 as well as access
to judges with national jurisdiction for making rapid
decisions on special cases, such as the disposition, and
potentially extradition, of high-profile cartel heads.
Military Police for Public Order (PMOP).
The PMOP is the best known and most controversial component of President Hernandez’s security
plan, and arguably the most misunderstood.
The PMOP organizationally falls under the joint
chiefs of staff of the Honduran armed forces, although
as noted previously, it is operationally assigned in its
entirety to FUSINA. The enabling law for the PMOP
was designed and passed through the Honduran Congress in August 2013 by Hernandez himself, who was
then President of the body.53
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The principal objective of the PMOP is to serve as
a professional force free of the corruption undercutting the effectiveness and the public acceptance of the
National Police; and that can legally and practically
conduct a subset of difficult law enforcement operations, such as imposing order in urban neighborhoods
dominated by the maras (gangs) and conducting actions against narcotrafficking organizations.
In addition to such core missions, PMOP has also
been deployed in other roles, including providing security for important public events and escorting highprofile criminals to prison or to the airport for extradition.54
As of July 2015, the PMOP had six battalions, each
with 524 persons, and similar complements of vehicles and equipment, as well as a canine battalion, oriented toward counter-drug operations. The first two
battalions were created in September 2013 and were
deployed in Tegucigalpa and its sister city Comayagüela. The third and fourth battalions were created
in February 2014, and the fifth, sixth, and the canine
battalion in August 2014.
The PMOP is anticipated to grow to 10 battalions,
plus the canine battalion, with a total complement
of 5,976 members. While the Hernandez administration has talked about an eventual “return to civilian
control” in Honduras after the problem of gangs and
insecurity is brought under control, and while such is
clearly contemplated in the fourth phase of Operation
MORAZÁN, Honduran experts interviewed for this
monograph indicated that the PMOP would likely
continue in existence.
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Although President Hernandez sought a constitutional amendment that would have separated the
PMOP from the Honduran armed forces as a separate
force under the executive branch, the defeat of this
initiative in the Honduran Congress in January 201555
left the organization as formally part of the military.
Undeterred, the President has announced his intention to revisit the issue of enshrining the PMOP within
the Honduran constitution as an independent entity
through a popular referendum to be held in conjunction with the 2017 national elections. 56
In establishing its doctrine, the PMOP has received
substantial assistance from the Honduran armed forces, including help in formulating its doctrine from the
doctrine organization of the Honduran Joint Chiefs of
Staff; although in doctrine and other matters, PMOP
has also drawn insights from the Honduran National
Police, the military police of the United States, and
other foreign partners such as Mexico, Colombia, and
Guatemala. According to PMOP authorities consulted
for this monograph, the organization continues to refine its doctrine and they hope to have it consolidated
by 2016.
At the level of enlisted personnel, the PMOP is
populated by the selection of candidates from volunteers from the Honduran armed forces. By contrast,
the officers of the PMOP are assigned to the unit by
the leadership. Thus, all PMOP personnel, both officers and civilians are, or become, active duty military
personnel.
Within the enlisted ranks, those interested in joining the PMOP must have at least one year of service
in the armed forces and must receive the approval of
their commanding officer to apply. According to representatives of the Honduran military interviewed for
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this monograph, applicants from all ranks and experience levels are accepted, but aside from officers and
non-commissioned officers (NCOs), younger recruits
are preferred because of their presumed physical
adeptness, as well as to avoid, where possible, disciplinary challenges arising from a large number of
older recruits supervised by younger officers.
Non-military applicants are accepted into the
PMOP only in a limited number of fields, including those with experience in law, medicine, and
psychology.
As the ranks of the PMOP units are filled, the
armed forces conduct a parallel campaign to backfill
those units from which the PMOP recruits are taken.
According to Honduran officers consulted for this
monograph, this process has caused some loss of experience and personnel shortages in operational units,
although the adverse impacts are expected to level off
once the current surge to create all 10 PMOP battalions has passed.
Once accepted, those entering the PMOP receive
initial training in basic competencies of the institution. Officers and NCOs attend the two-month long
“Military Police Operations Course,” while those of
lower ranks attend the four month “Basic Course.”
Both courses are taught in the armored cavalry post
RECALBLIN (Regimento de Caballería Blindado) in the
Department of Choluteca.
As of the end of 2015, both courses were taught
by officials from the military police itself, by definition, former military officers with two years or less
in the organization (based on the date of the PMOP’s
creation).
Upon graduating the operations course or basic
course, candidates are officially accepted as members
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of the PMOP. From this point, candidates may receive
additional training in police specialties, such as forensic graphology, customs, crime scene investigations,
the chain of custody, combat medicine, and human
rights. For these specialty courses, outside experts are
brought in, including personnel from the public ministry, which supports the PMOP through programs in
their “Training School for the Public Ministry.”
In order to avoid the risk that those joining the
PMOP are, or later become, corrupt (as has occurred
widely within the Honduran national police), the
PMOP has a program of monitoring and confidence
tests, including psychological testing and other
screening upon entry, as well as polygraphs approximately every six months for those members serving
in the organization. In addition, by contrast to regular
police officers, the military structure of PMOP places
its members under more constant supervision and
deploys its members in a fashion that, in principle,
gives them fewer opportunities for close contact with
the people in the zones in which they operate. As a
result, those interviewed for this monograph argue
that members of the PMOP are less vulnerable to
being corrupted.
On the other hand, others argue that the limitations
that the PMOP have in their contact with the population also gives them fewer opportunities to gather intelligence from, and build positive relationships with,
that population.
Tigres.
The elite national police unit called the Tigres (Tigers), like the PMOP, was spearheaded as a legislative initiative of Juan Orlando Hernandez before he
became president.57
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The Tigres were designed to be an elite, highly capable unit within the police force for taking on difficult
missions like those against transnational organized
crime groups. From the beginning, the unit was closely coordinated with, and substantially funded by the
United States, which provided equipment, confidence
testing, and training paid for by the U.S. Department
of State, including courses conducted by Colombian
Special Forces units.
At the time of the research for this monograph, the
Tigres had an estimated 250 persons, less than a tenth
the number of personnel in the PMOP.
An important contributor to Hernandez, then head
of the Congress, in establishing the Tigres was not only
the pervasive corruption within the regular Honduran police, but also nine prior initiatives by the United
States to establish special units within that force in
areas such as anti-gang activities, anti-kidnapping,
and counter-narcotics; this emphasized to him and
others in the government that in providing assistance
in the fight against organized crime and insecurity,
the United States preferred to work through civilian
organizations.
While organizationally the Tigres are part of
the Honduran National Police, within the
Ministry of Public Security, they are under the
operational command of FUSINA, along with the
PMOP.
Despite the substantial capabilities of the unit, the
Honduran government sought to minimize the public
profile of the force following an unfortunate incident
involving the improper diversion of $1.3 million in
cash seized58 in October 2014, during the unit’s first
major operation; the arrest of Miguel Arnulfo and
Luis Alonso Valle Valle, leaders of the Honduran narcotics smuggling organization Los Valles.59 Although
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the theft was quickly discovered, the incident cast a
shadow over the unit at a key moment when the question of the need for a “military police,” rather than
new or reformed units within the Honduran National
police, was a key theme of debate.
As a complement to the creation of new structures
such as the PMOP and the Tigres, the Hernandez administration has also engaged in a purge of corrupt
elements of the National Police.60 As set forth in Operation MORAZÁN, the official plan of the Honduran
government is to return law enforcement operations
to civilian organizations such as the National Police
once both public order has been restored and corruption within police institutions has been brought under
control.
Other Organizations within the Public Ministry.
Although FUSINA and the PMOP, and to a lesser
extent the Tigres, have received the lion’s share of media attention in the Hernandez administration’s struggle against organized crime, other organizations have
also played an important role. These include Agencia
Técnico de Investigación Criminal (ATIC), Fiscal Especial
Contra el Crimen Organizado (FESCO), and the Dirección de la Lucha Contra Narcotrafico (DLCN).
According to Hondurans consulted for this monograph, the creation of ATIC was driven by Honduran
Attorney General Oscar Fernandez Chinchilla to provide greater investigative capabilities within the public ministry. ATIC has received a significant share of
resources, particularly in the 2015 fiscal year, generating some resentment from other organizations, such
as DNIC, whose own budget has not expanded to a
similar degree. As of July 2015, ATIC had approxi-
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mately 120 investigators, with an additional 50 reportedly being added.
The DLCN, as noted previously, is the principal investigative organization in the fight against criminal
organizations. It was created in 1995 as an independent organization under the Honduran Public Ministry. As of July 2015, the DLCN had a modest force
of 53, although it was programmed to nearly double
in size, with 43 new investigators. The body works
closely with FUSINA in the fight against criminal organizations. Indeed, its support from the armed forces
is explicitly specified in Article 48 of the law enabling
the organization.
Prior to December 2015, the DLCN was headed by
Isaac Santos, a retired military officer. Owing to differences with the head of the Public Ministry, Oscar
Fernando Chinchilla, Santos was dismissed and replaced by Soraya Cálix, a career criminal investigator
who previously headed the Public Ministry Office of
the Special Prosecutor Against Organized Crime.61
In addition to its funding by the Honduran government, the DLCN also receives training and other support from the Russian Federal Drug Control Service
(FSKN),62 among other international organizations.
Senior DLCN personnel, such as its deputy head Zoilo
Salustio Hernandez, reportedly travel frequently to
Russia for training programs.
FUSINA Operations.
As of July 2015, within the framework of Operation
MORAZÁN, the most significant operational activities of FUSINA included the interdiction of narcotrafficking flows, operations against narcotraffickers and
other high-profile criminals, and the establishment of
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security in areas dominated by maras, and other police
organizations.63
To this end, two types of FUSINA operations
stood out.
First, FUSINA deployed significant numbers of the
newly created PMOP to major urban areas, such as Tegucigalpa, Comayagüela, and San Pedro Sula. These
forces patrolled public spaces, and allowed authorities to re-establish a presence in neighborhoods such
as Flor del Campo (Tegucigalpa), which had previously become so heavily dominated by gangs that the
national police did not dare to enter.
Second, FUSINA employed its forces to deny the
use of national territory as a transit zone or base of
operations for narcotraffickers. The efforts of FUSINA
in this respect is conceptualized in terms of three
“shields”:
1. an air shield, which refers to control over Honduran airspace against narcotics flights, particularly in the remote and sparsely populated
eastern part of the country, which became a
major problem during Honduras’ period of international isolation in 2009;
2. a maritime shield, to protect the Honduran
coast and inland waterways against the importation of drugs and their associated transfer to
overland traffic via vehicles and persons, generally toward Guatemala; and,
3. a land shield, associated with the control of
the Honduran-Guatemala border via the interagency Maya-Chorti Task Force, as well as the
deployment of military forces throughout the
country to control routes used to move drugs
overland from clandestine airstrips and coastal and river disembarkation points across the
country, generally toward that border.
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The air shield was enabled by the passage of a law
in January 2014, authorizing the Honduran military to
shoot down aircraft making unauthorized incursions
into its national airspace.64 Its application in Honduran airspace is supported by the acquisition of three
radars from Israel, delivered in late 2013.65 Nonetheless, the risk that the program could lead to the downing of an innocent aircraft by the Honduran military
reportedly raised concerns within the United States,
which, in response, restricted military support activities that could contribute to such a shoot-down.66
Although Honduran officials interviewed for this
monograph maintained that the air shield is functioning well even without U.S. support, to date, the
Honduran military has not forced down a single
aircraft. Nonetheless, since the implementation of
the air shield, drug flights to Honduras have fallen
dramatically.67
As a complement to blocking air traffic, the Honduran government also engages in a continual process
of identifying and destroying clandestine airstrips
in the country.68 However, one official consulted for
this monograph characterized such operations as a
relatively unproductive game, with the government
disabling airstrips and the narcotraffickers rebuilding
them. Yet, others consulted for this study countered,
arguing that despite the ease of building airstrips in
the generally flat terrain in the east of the country in
La Mosquitia, the drug trafficker’s response provides
insights into who the narcotraffickers are and who
is helping them, since doing so generates observable
and traceable activity, particularly since construction
equipment is not common in the remote areas where
such airstrips are built.69
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With respect to the maritime shield, the Honduran
government has generally focused on deploying naval
assets along the Atlantic coast, where the Honduran
Navy has boosted its presence from one modest shore
facility to seven, in addition to augmenting control
points on inland rivers.
At least two Honduran naval craft have been deployed in the Gulf of Fonseca to perform counter-drug
missions.
To date, the maritime domain has been the area in
which the United States has most effectively been able
to help Honduras with material, training, and intelligence support, as well as with its own complementary
maritime operations.70
In addition to support from the United States, the
Honduran Navy has generally been effective in working with Nicaragua to coordinate intercept operations
along the coast shared by the two countries. According to persons interviewed for this monograph, such
cooperation reportedly includes relatively fluid exchanges of intelligence and is bolstered by good political relations between the two countries and their
presidents.71
In the Gulf of Fonseca, on Honduras’ Pacific coast,
coordination of naval intercept operations is complicated by the unresolved dispute over the maritime
boundary in the area between Honduras, Nicaragua,
and El Salvador,72 although the coordination between
the three navies has reportedly improved.
In general terms, Honduras’ maritime shield has
been limited by a relatively small navy of aging vessels supporting a relatively high operational tempo.
Honduras currently has three large craft and 25 smaller vessels. Nonetheless, the country has acquisition
projects that would increase its capabilities.
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As an example, the capability of the Honduran
Navy to perform coastal intercepts has been bolstered
by new militarized “go-fast” boats, seized from narcotraffickers. With assistance from the United States,
these craft have been adapted with new 300 horsepower 4-cylinder engines, hull modifications, and gun
mounts. According to senior Hondurans consulted for
this monograph, these new craft have been particularly useful for patrolling in the relatively shallow waters
along the Atlantic shoreline, which features numerous
inlets and islands.
Beyond these “go-fast” boats, the Honduran Navy
is reportedly considering the acquisition of two new
roll-on/roll-off landing craft from the Colombian vendor Cotecmar, as well as a new offshore patrol vessel.
Turning to the land shield portion of Honduras’
counter-drug operations, the principal focus to date
of the Honduran government has been the control of
the Honduras-Guatemala border. Through FUSINA,
the Honduran government has also deployed ground
forces to control routes for the movement of drugs in
other parts of the country.
The primary vehicle for controlling Honduras’
border with Guatemala has been the interagency Maya-Chorti Task Force. One important goal for FUSINA
in operating this task force on the border between the
two countries has been to cut the numerous informal
border crossings (pasos ciegos) that allow narcotics and
other contraband to move across the border without
state control. A study by the Conference of Central
American Armed Forces (CFAC) estimated that there
were 55 such informal crossings along the HondurasGuatemala border alone.
While the Maya-Chorti Task Force has significantly increased the presence of Honduran forces in the

31

border region,73 the sheer quantity of drugs moving
through the area, the difficult terrain, and the number
of people with adjoining property on both sides of the
border facilitating passage of contraband through the
pasos ciegos continue to make controlling the border
difficult.
Beyond the presence of the Maya-Chorti Task
Force on the border, the majority of FUSINA’s PMOP
and civilian police elements are deployed in Honduras’ principal urban areas: Tegucigalpa, Comayagüela, and San Pedro Sula. Smaller numbers of ground
forces are also deployed throughout the country to
control overland movement of narcotics, to provide
security, to gather intelligence, and to conduct operations against high-profile criminals once authorized
by judicial and other appropriate authorities.
With respect to operations against specific criminal targets, the FUSINA concept of operations begins
with intelligence to identify a potential criminal target or activity of interest. Such intelligence is obtained
from multiple sources, including the country’s newlycreated National Investigative Intelligence Organization (Dirección Nacional de Investigación e Inteligencia
[DNII]), formed in 2013,74 and which reportedly has
a particular specialization in electronic intelligence.
Such intelligence collection includes obtaining information from PMOP units, civilian national police
units, investigative organizations such as the national
counter-narcotrafficking organization (DNIC), as well
as foreign sources, with important partners reportedly
including Nicaragua,75 Colombia, Guatemala, and the
United States.
Supported by such multi-source intelligence, in
principle, FUSINA leverages the prosecutors under
its operational control in conjunction with investigators from supporting organizations such as DNIC, to
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prepare cases to be acted upon. Where the case requires police action against a criminal target, FUSINA
then obtains the authorization of the relevant judicial
authority to proceed. For normal operations, a local
judge will typically be used to approve such action;
but for high-profile cases where there is concern that
the local judge could be corrupted or intimidated,
FUSINA has three special judges with national jurisdiction and presents its request to one of these individuals to authorize police action.
In addition to such judges, another organizational
innovation of FUSINA in the fight against organized
crime is the use of embedded investigators and prosecutors. Such investigators and prosecutors are operationally assigned to FUSINA and often travel with the
military and police units to the scene of the operation.
The FUSINA leadership believes that such integration
makes the process of coordination between parts of
the police/criminal system faster and more accurate,
helping to eliminate delays and miscues that contributed to the near total impunity within the Honduran
justice system. Prior to embedded investigators and
prosecutors, for example, military or police units
would conduct an operation and then transfer the
case to authorities to conduct a judicial investigation.
Under the new system, with police investigators and
prosecutors present during the operation, they are reportedly able to do their investigation more rapidly,
as well as with a better understanding of what actually transpired in the operation.
The new approach also generated concerns. One
law enforcement expert consulted for this monograph
noted that having an investigator spend days “tromping around in the woods with a military unit” was
perhaps not the best use of time, given the limited
number of prosecutors available.
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The new system also raises questions about protection of citizen rights through the traditional separation between police, prosecutor, and judge, creating
the appearance of “judicial officials being put in the
service of the police.”
Yet such concerns notwithstanding, the new system has arguably contributed to improvements in the
struggle against crime and insecurity in the country.
With respect to the conduct of operations at a technical level under the new system, if a law enforcement
action such as the detention of a person is necessary,
FUSINA may use either PMOP units, national police
units (including recently created elite units such as the
Tigres), or a combination of both to execute the operation. As an example, the previously mentioned October 2014 operation to detain Miguel Arnulfo and Luis
Alonso Valle Valle employed both the Tigres and the
PMOP, as well as other units.76
To understand the change represented by the employment of PMOP in operations against transnational organized crime entities, it is important to note that
in the pre-FUSINA period in Honduras, as in other
Central American countries such as El Salvador, the
military conducted operations in tandem with national police units in order to have sufficient firepower
and legal arrest authority. In Honduras, perhaps even
more so than in those other countries, the level of corruption within the police puts many operations at risk
due to the possibility that some people in the police
chain of command are being paid by criminal organizations and tipping off the criminals prior to the conduct of an operation. The use of the PMOP, by taking
the national police out of the chain, has likely reduced
the risk of compromised operations. Yet in the short
term, one troubling side effect has been to substitute
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the military for the police in important law enforcement operations, relegating the police to only routine
or inconsequential activities.
Beyond improved coordination between military,
law enforcement, and judicial organizations, FUSINA
has also sought to increase jointness and the interagency character of Honduran government operations.
The organization, for example, coordinates the use of
naval assets to resupply and move personnel of other
military branches and government organizations between posts, including naval bases and other control
points in remote parts of the country. Such coordination has become increasingly important, not only for
deploying investigators, prosecutors, police and military police contingents, and supporting intelligence
operations in remote areas, but also in supporting the
Honduran Navy in establishing and sustaining multiple new bases to control remote areas of the country’s
coast, such as in the Department of Gracias a Dios.
To minimize the probability of the corruption of
the soldiers, policemen, investigators, and others in
the organization, FUSINA has adopted a policy of frequent personnel rotations; yet doing so has created a
significant logistics burden. In addition to the adverse
impact on personnel, the ships, aircraft, and vehicles
used to transport the personnel are strained as well.
Finally, the rotation policy requires FUSINA to reimburse the Honduran Navy for fuel and other resources
that are used in support of FUSINA operations.
Lastly, in addition to the operations themselves,
the leadership of FUSINA has recognized the importance of strategic communication and has dedicated
attention to managing public perceptions of its successes. As an example, statistics involving the activities of the organizations under its operational control,
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including counter-narcotics operations, actions against
clandestine runways, confiscation of properties, arms
seizures, arrests of criminal leaders, and other activities, are reported through FUSINA.77 Even when an
operation is primarily performed by one particular organization, such as the PMOP, the Tigres, ATIC, or the
DNIC, per policy of the Honduran leadership, it is reported as performed “by FUSINA” with “the support
of” the other Honduran organizations. While persons
consulted for this monograph indicated that this posture has caused some minor resentment among the
organizations leading the operation, it has also arguably bolstered the image of FUSINA and the perception that the government is conducting a coordinated
national-level campaign against organized crime and
insecurity.
Penitentiary Reform.
In parallel with activities of FUSINA and associated organizations such as the PMOP, the Hernandez
administration is also attempting to reform the penitentiary system. Like other penitentiary systems in
Central America and elsewhere in the region, that of
Honduras is considered vastly overcrowded with an
inmate population of more than 14,500 and growing,
in facilities with a capacity for 8,000.78 Moreover, as in
neighboring Guatemala and El Salvador, the facilities
have become dominated by the criminals who inhabit
them, using them as secure spaces from which to manage their extortion operations in coordination with
members of their organization on the outside.79
One of the initiatives already put into place by the
Hernandez administration is the blocking of cell phone
service to and from the prisons to limit the number of
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extortion calls made from inside.80 Such control has
been partially successful, with a significant decrease in
such extortion calls.81 Reportedly, such controls have
not been completely effective because it has not been
possible to block all calls, including those by prisoners
using contraband satellite phones (for which service is
not interrupted by the blocking of cellphone signals)
and because prisoners are still able to communicate
with the outside through visits from family members,
relaying instructions to others who can deliver the extortion demands by phone or in person from outside
the prison walls.82
To help address the challenge of prison overcrowding, the Hernandez administration proposed
creating two new facilities: a minimum-security and
a medium-to-maximum security prison, which together would provide capacity for 4,500 inmates. To
date, the first of these facilities, in the town of Porvenir, with space for 2,000 inmates, has been completed.
The second, in the north of the country near the town
of Anaco, designed to house 2,400 inmates, is reportedly going slowly due to cost overruns and lack of
resources.
The Honduran military has also created a small
detention facility for high-level prisoners within the
compound of the 1st Battalion, with space for approximately 20 persons, maintaining those held there in
relative isolation and control, if also under relatively
sparse conditions, reportedly without access to cellphones or computers.
At the same time that the government is adding
these two new prisons and the small supplemental
facility in the 1st Battalion headquarters, the government is also contemplating consolidating the 24 facilities throughout the country down to 12 and modernizing and re-establishing control over those that remain.
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While in the short term, control of Honduran prisons remains a problem, as with Honduras’ neighbors,
the military is attempting to play a role by controlling
the perimeters separating the prisons from the outside communities; yet prison perimeter control is not
a popular mission for the military and only partially
prevents activities, such as the smuggling of weapons
and contraband cellphones to inmates. However, it is
regarded by the military as necessary because of the
failure of civilian law enforcement to prevent such
flows due to the ability of the gangs to corrupt and
intimidate those controlling the prisons. This includes
realistic threats to harm prison workers and their
families due to the ties that inmates have with gangs
outside the prison.
Cooperation with the United States.
In its activities against organized crime and insecurity, the Hernandez administration has made an effort to work more closely with the United States, albeit
with mixed success.
As president of the Congress, in January 2012,
Hernandez successfully spearheaded a change to the
provision of the Honduran constitution prohibiting
extradition; and in May 2014, the country conducted
its first extradition to the United States: Carlos Arnoldo Lobo.83 Although not widely publicized, Honduran experts consulted for this monograph noted that
the country continues to extradite an average of approximately five people to the United States per week.
The Honduran government has also worked closely with the United States on operations against the
leadership of narcotrafficking groups, particularly the
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two principal family-based smuggling organizations
in the country: the Los Valles and the Cachiros.
In addition, the Hernandez administration has cooperated closely with the United States in the area of
maritime narcotrafficking interdiction operations as
part of the maritime shield concept.84
At a personal level, President Hernandez reportedly has had a particularly good relationship with the
U.S. Southern Command and General John F. Kelly,
the U.S. Marine Corps general who commanded it
through the end of 2015.85
Cooperation with Other Countries.
While Honduras continues to work closely with
the United States in its fight against gangs, drugs, and
other elements of organized crime and insecurity, it
also collaborates with and receives support in this
struggle from a variety of other countries, including
Taiwan, Russia, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, among
others.
With respect to Russia, as noted previously, Honduras’ principal counter-narcotics organization, the
DLCN, and potentially other organizations, reportedly receive training and intelligence support from their
Russian counterpart, the FSKN.
Nicaragua is reportedly one of the closest collaborators in the region with Honduras with respect to
counter-narcotics intelligence, as well as police and
military operations. There is reportedly a fluid cooperation between the two countries in patrolling their
combined shoreline, and the presidents of both countries reportedly enjoy a close personal relationship.
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Guatemala is the first country in the region to
establish joint multinational patrols with Honduras
along their shared border, in the form of the MayaChorti Task Force.86 Currently, the two countries reportedly collaborate closely with respect to managing
the shared border and on other issues.
Impacts of Honduran Government Efforts in the
Fight Against Organized Crime and Gangs.
Although President Hernandez had only been
in power two years at the time this monograph was
written, his administration’s security policies have
had a remarkable impact on delinquency and organized crime in the country. Nonetheless, some outside
the administration have questioned the accuracy of
government figures showing strong progress against
murders and criminal activity.87 Whatever the truth
regarding the statistics, it is clear that much work remains to be done.
According to official figures, homicides in Honduras during the January-July period dropped from
3,688 in 2013, to 3,271 in 2014, to 2,757 in 2015.88
With respect to narco-flights, prior to the Hernandez regime, almost 80% of U.S.-bound drug flights
stopped in Honduras. By 2015, thanks in part to the
country’s air interdiction program, the number of
such flights showing up on U.S. radars had fallen to
almost negligible numbers.89
Narcotraffickers moving drugs are reportedly
changing tactics. Some have switched from light
planes to larger turboprop aircraft. Another new tactic has been an increase in short, low-altitude flights
below the radar monitoring the area. With respect to
the overland traffic, Honduran authorities noted an
increase in the use of vehicles with hidden compart40

ments (caletas), as well as more smuggling inside of
animals such as mules and horses. In the maritime
domain, those moving drugs through the country
previously sent large shipments of up to 2,000 kg of
cocaine in “go-fast” boats. During the past year, however, there has reportedly been a trend toward the use
of smaller, slower vessels, following more indirect
routes.
According to Honduran law enforcement officials,
Honduran traffickers used to bring in narco-shipments by air to Atlantic coast towns, such as Palacios
in the northeast of the country, and openly transfer
their cargo into armored cars for transit to Guatemala
via highway. In the past year, they have reportedly
switched to more remote landing facilities in areas
such as Ibanos and Brus, then covertly moving their
product via canals and other means before eventually
being able to use roads.
Another observed shift, prompted by increased
counter-drug activities in the east of the country, is
the expanded use of routes along the Pacific coast to
move drugs. Areas such as Choluteca (on the Pacific
coast of the country where Honduras converges with
El Salvador to the north and Nicaragua to the south)
have reported an increase in narcotrafficking activity.
The increased use of the Pacific side of the country for
drug smuggling is reflected in the unexplained surge
in upscale houses, hotels, and other establishments
in Choluteca. The expansion of routes on the Pacific
side of the country includes the smuggling of cocaine
across the Nicaraguan border in animals.
In addition to the displacement of narcotrafficking
operations to the Pacific, more drugs are reportedly
being sent from South America through Costa Rica
and Panama, instead of directly to Honduras.
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Beyond the impact on patterns of trafficking and
the tactics of narcotraffickers, the combination of
increased interdiction activities and increased operations against cartel leaders has reportedly had an
impact on the structure of criminal groups moving
narcotics. Smaller groups, which were once contractors to major family clans such as the Cachiros, including: the Byron Ruiz organization, Ramon Matta (son of
famous cartel leader Juan Ramon Matta), the Olancho
Cartel of Moises Amador (who was eliminated in an
operation in July 2015), the Sizo Cartel, and the Brus
Cartel, are reportedly working in a more independent
fashion, generating increased violence in some areas
of the country as a result.
With respect to maras, the intervention of the military police has allowed the government to re-establish
presence in some urban neighborhoods. The most
celebrated case has been the re-establishing of state
presence in the Flor de Campo, a neighborhood in the
south of Tegucigalpa, once so dominated by the gangs
that the national police could not maintain a presence
there.90 The PMOP has also reportedly restored state
presence in other once gang-ridden neighborhoods
as well, including Ulloa, Carrizal, Campo Cielo, and
Centavo in the south of Tegucigalpa, as well as the El
Lato and Barrio Kennedy neighborhoods in the heart
of the city.91
Despite progress in such neighborhoods, persons
consulted for this monograph generally concurred
that only limited progress had been made in reducing
the level of extortion and other criminal activities by
the gangs. Others noted that in some urban neighborhoods, merchants such as taxi and bus drivers who
once had to pay extortion money to three or four different groups, now only have to pay off the principal
two (B-18 and MS-13).
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To some degree, in reaction to the presence of
the PMOP and increased activities by Honduran law
enforcement in general, the groups are reportedly
changing their extortion tactics, making greater use
of radios and other communication alternatives to cell
phones to avoid government electronic surveillance.
Some gangs are also employing children to collect
extortion payments, as well as obligating non-gangaffiliated civilians to participate in such activities to
prevent them from exposing gang members to law
enforcement organizations.
Challenges for Honduras in the Fight Against
Organized Crime.
The ability of Honduras to make significant advances against organized crime and insecurity must
be understood in the context of uncertainty in the
continuity of the current Hernandez administration.
As noted in the introduction of this monograph,
throughout 2015, and particularly in July, the Hernandez government was confronted by protesters calling
themselves the “indignant,” decrying what they saw
as a combination of corruption and procedural irregularities by the President and those surrounding him,
seeking to enrich themselves and to centralize power,
using payoffs and other forms of influence within
the nation’s institutions to marginalize its political
opponents.92
Yet such protests do not necessarily reflect a desire to replace the Hernandez administration with a
return to the previous left-of-center regime of Manuel
Zelaya, or its contemporary manifestation, the LIBRE
movement, even if he and his followers hope to capitalize on it as such.93
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The continuity of the Hernandez administration
in power neither assures success in the fight against
organized crime and insecurity, nor would its fall
condemn the nation to devolve into a narco-state. Yet
at least in the short term, President Hernandez’s fall
would likely undermine the efforts of the government
to combat organized crime and insecurity, including the loss of the lessons learned from the innovations achieved. Still, the degree of the negative impact
would depend on the degree of political chaos generated in the country by his ouster, and the orientation
of the government that followed.
Beyond the future of the Hernandez administration, the greatest challenge for the country in combating transnational organized crime and other sources
of insecurity over the medium term is, arguably, corruption.
In addition to the previously mentioned accusations against President Hernandez, the exposure of
narco-politicians, such as Jose “Chepe” Handal, provides a glimpse into the extent of the problem; as does
the assassination of politician Juan Gomez in January
2015, which reportedly so frightened the leaders of
the Cachiros that they fled to the Bahamas the next day
to turn themselves in to U.S. authorities, rather than
face the Honduran justice system.94 Similarly, the U.S.
extradition request against former Honduran VicePresident and head of the Continental Group, Jaime
Rosenthal,95 illustrates how deeply corruption and
criminality has infected all parts of Honduran politics
and the economy.
On the other hand, corruption at the highest levels of the Honduran political system is not necessarily centralized in one interested group. Corruption at
these levels permits innovative or courageous politi-
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cians to combat organized crime in select areas, while,
by design or otherwise, leaving other interests untouched.
Below the level of political elites, such corruption within the police force also creates particularly
difficult obstacles in combating organized crime and
insecurity. The police must interact with the population on an ongoing basis, while its adversaries have
enormous resources to bribe officials and put them
and their families at risk. Such corruption directly
impedes the ability of law enforcement and other
government organizations to combat criminals and
undermines their confidence in working together and
sharing information, thus destroying the effectiveness
of the organization from the inside.
Police Reform.
The elimination of corrupt elements from the national police and its reform as an institution, have
gone very slowly. Although a significant number of
polygraphs and other confidence testing has been
performed, few of the policemen who have failed the
confidence tests, and even fewer senior level police
officials, have been removed.
The effectiveness of police reform has been limited
by three factors:
1. it began from the bottom up, not the top down,
leaving in place the senior leadership, which is
arguably a major part of the problem;
2. the process lacks the transparency to generate confidence among a public already deeply
skeptical about both political and police corruption; and,
3. the replacement of corrupt police is impeded
by legal and administrative obstacles.
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Within the current system, the internal investigative arm of the national police, DICEP (Direccion de
Investigacion y Evaluacion de la Carrera Policial), can recommend dismissing police officers, but does not actually have the authority to fire them.
Further complicating dismissing police officers
suspected of involvement in corruption is a culture in
which Honduran judges regard polygraph tests as an
insufficient basis for firing officers.
In part, Honduran experts interviewed for this
analysis suggest that one problem slowing the purging of corrupt officials from the Honduran police is the
Organic Law, which defines the police organization,
and which makes it very difficult to fire officers without a lengthy set of procedures and extensive proof
of wrongdoing. Although changes were made to this
law in 2012, those consulted for this monograph did
not regard the modifications as sufficient to make a
difference.
Even if the Organic Law could be sufficiently modified or replaced, those consulted for this monograph
suggested that the extent of corruption uncovered
within the police has exceeded what those initiating
the reforms initially expected,96 making it difficult to
fire all of the contaminated police without destroying
the national police as an institution, creating an even
greater problem of public order.
Potential Future PMOP Corruption.
By contrast to the national police, corruption in the
PMOP and other newly created security organizations
has been limited. Nonetheless, the scandal of the $1.3
million in cash stolen by members of the well-trained
and carefully vetted police unit the Tigres illustrates
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that confidence tests do not establish absolute guarantees of future behavior and highlight that publicly exposed incidents of corruption may damage the organization in ways that go far beyond the incident itself.
In the case of the PMOP, although the organization
generally adopts a relatively distant posture from the
community that it protects, and is subject to frequent
rotations of personnel, its members are not invulnerable to corruption. PMOP units, for instance, coincidentally patrol in the same areas as regular police,
setting the stage for the development of relationships
between the two, and the transfer of certain improper
behaviors or attitudes by the national police to their
PMOP counterparts.
In less than two years of the existence of PMOP,
according to officials from the organization, approximately 10% of the force have been dismissed for reasons related to failing confidence tests.97 While such
figures suggest that the system is effective in identifying and eliminating personnel at risk of being corrupted, it also illustrates that such risks exist despite
the disciplined military culture from which PMOP
members are drawn.
Institutional Rivalries.
To a degree, the PMOP has generated discomfort
both in the national police, which views the organization as a rival police force, as well as within the
military, which supports it, but reportedly has reservations about how its planned separation from the
armed forces (pursuant to a successful national referendum in 2017 to change the constitution) would
affect the military as an institution.
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More broadly, there are also other institutional rivalries, including competition for resources for investigation between the newly-created police investigative organization ATIC (the brainchild of Honduran
Attorney General Oscar Fernandez Chinchilla), and
the national counter-drug organization, DNIC. Indeed, such rivalries may have played a role in the dismissal of the head of DNIC, Isaac Santos, in December
2015.98
Intelligence.
Despite an innovative structure and the considerable progress that FUSINA has achieved within two
years of its formation, the organization reportedly
lacks effective intelligence capabilities at multiple levels, and lacks the ability to integrate intelligence from
the organizations that support it to produce complete,
timely, actionable knowledge.
FUSINA’s military police organization, the PMOP,
even with the greatest presence on the ground, is not
only new to police-style intelligence gathering and
investigation, but maintains a relative distance from
the local community to avoid corruption, which also
impedes the collection of information from them. Although FUSINA interagency task forces at the departmental level generally contain regular police units,
and although these police units are experienced in collecting intelligence from the local community, these
police are often viewed by their military counterparts
as unreliable, and their intelligence thus suspect. In
addition, persons interviewed for this monograph
spoke of concerns within the military that police units,
bitter over the formation of the PMOP as an affront
to their own competence, may not completely share
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intelligence with the organization, potentially prejudicing FUSINA performance.
Beyond the PMOP, FUSINA is also hampered in
its intelligence capabilities by its dependence on multiple outside sources for its intelligence, including:
data obtained via national technical means from the
recently formed DNII, which is still in its infancy (created in 2013); as well as intelligence from the PMOP,
police units, and investigative organizations such as
the DNIC. In addition to being new, the fact that these
organizations report to different ministries, plus have
concerns about corruption in the other entities with
which they are working, augments their tendency to
protect their own intelligence and sources, creating
“stovepipes.”
Criminal Investigation Capability.
Parallel to the problem with intelligence, Honduras currently has numerous organizations that
perform law enforcement investigation and intelligence, including, but not limited to, the previously
mentioned organizations PMOP, ATIC, DNIC, and
DNII. The result is that each has access to only a piece
of relevant knowledge on the criminal activities that
they are pursuing. Consequently, they lack the ability to pool resources to meet specific needs, they may
engage in redundant efforts, and there is an uneven
level of quality.
FUSINA Interagency Coordination.
Although FUSINA is an innovative design reflecting the incorporation of much thought and operational experience of its creators, the institutional compromises required to bring it to fruition may well generate
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problems that hamper it as an organization. To accommodate both police and military organizational
equities, for example, each FUSINA departmental
interagency task force has a dual command structure,
represented by both a military and a police official.
While the arrangement avoids placing police officers
under the direct operational control of a military officer, or vice-versa, it complicates accountability, and
creates ambiguity regarding the chain of command.
In practice such issues are generally worked out
without difficulty on an interpersonal basis between
the military and police commanders in charge, with
the military head of the task force taking orders directly from the military officer who heads FUSINA, while
the police commander of the task force receives his orders from the deputy commander of FUSINA, who is
a member of the police. This arrangement reportedly
works so long as there is no significant disagreement
about the operation between either the police or military leader at the task force level, or between the head
of FUSINA and his police deputy commander.
While police officers are not generally put directly
under military officers, it has occurred at least once at
the departmental level: in Olancho, where three Tigres
(national police) units were put under control of the
local military officer due to the complete removal of
the police in the zone because of corruption charges.
Although the arrangement was made to function,
knowledgeable persons interviewed for this monograph acknowledged that it generated some tension.
FUSINA Administrative Challenges.
As with any new organization, a number of operational difficulties have emerged within the FUSINA
structure that have caused tension and are still being
worked out. For example, regular (non-PMOP) mili50

tary officers within the FUSINA structure do not receive additional pay or compensation for incidental
expenses while deployed to locations far from their
permanent home and family. According to persons
consulted for this monograph, the workload of local
FUSINA commanders can be onerous by comparison
to that of regular military officers because they are
double-hatted; having responsibilities for the military
unit that they are head of as well as for the interagency
coordination of the FUSINA task force that they command, each of which can be a full-time responsibility.
Finally, the frequent rotation of personnel assigned
to FUSINA, in an attempt to avoid the corruption of
units from their prolonged exposure to the persons of
one area has also reportedly put a significant burden
on the organization—particularly command staffs at
the interagency task force (departmental) level.
Honduras-Guatemala Border Control.
Currently, the vast majority of drugs entering Honduras through the Atlantic coast cross the HondurasGuatemala border on their journey to the north. The
border has traditionally been difficult to control due
to the large number of puntos ciegos (informal border
crossings), combined with persons owning adjoining
properties on both sides of the border, facilitating passage from one side to the other. Control of the border
is also compounded by the corruption of police and
the historic absence of state presence.
The Honduran government has significantly expanded its activities in the area through the MayaChorti Task Force. It has sought to close many of the
informal crossings, and has arguably employed the
PMOP to lessen the effects of corruption. Yet, the
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border continues to be challenged by the sheer volume of drugs moving through the area, and the constantly changing and innovative tactics used by narcotraffickers to cross.
A new free trade accord signed between Honduras
and Guatemala in February 2015,99 and in effect on December 15 of the same year,100 is likely to increase the
volume of legitimate trade crossing the border, creating more opportunities for narcotraffickers to conceal
the flow of drugs and other illicit goods.
Compounding the difficulties in controlling the
border traffic created by the free trade accord, the
opening of an improved highway in August 2015 from
Choluteca (where Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua converge in the Gulf of Fonseca) to Puerto Cortez
in the north101 may increase further illicit shipments
crossing the country from south to north toward the
border.
Money Laundering.
Money laundering by transnational organized
crime groups is a growing problem in Honduras.
The Honduran economy is arguably less convenient
for money laundering than neighboring El Salvador,
which uses the U.S. dollar as its currency, or Panama,
with its large infrastructure for international finance.
Yet money laundering in Honduras, including both
the remote east of the country as well as urban areas
such as Tegucigalpa, Comayagüela, and San Pedro
Sula, is reportedly increasing.102
In December 2014, acknowledging the problem,
the Honduran government passed an important new
anti-laundering law.103 Perhaps the extent of the problem was highlighted most dramatically in October
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2015 when the Honduran government shut down
Continental Bank, the largest financial firm in the
country,104 based on charges by the U.S. Department
of the Treasury that the bank was involved in laundering drug money for the transportistas (carriers) organization Cachiros.105
Human Rights.
While the number of alleged human rights violations involving the Honduran military to date has
been limited, the number of accusations have increased since the formation of the PMOP.106 Its creation
and role in fighting crime has given it high public visibility. The PMOP arguably has the greatest regular
interaction with the population, although as noted
previously, it is more limited than that of regular
police units.
While the PMOP leadership appears to take its role
seriously in both exerting controls and providing human rights training to its personnel, training courses
are not always adequate to prevent bad actions by all
personnel.
In addition, some consulted for this monograph
argued that the possibility for improper treatment
of the population is increased by the military character of the organization, fueling a disposition of some
members to view the areas to which they are assigned
as enemy territory filled with gang members, narcos,
and other criminals, thus setting the stage for abuses
to occur.
On the other side, it is to be expected that the criminal elements or others whose activities are impaired
by the PMOP presence will be tempted to leverage the
suspicion with which some members of Honduran
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society view the organization107 and file complaints or
make statements to the media that discredit the organization to hamper its freedom of action.
Leadership by Civilian Institutions.
While the innovative solutions adopted by the
Hernandez administration are not necessarily undemocratic, for some they generate concern regarding
the character of democracy in the country. A December 2014 report by the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights expressed concern that through the
law authorizing PMOP, the government was assigning to the military regular citizen security tasks that
were not necessarily appropriate to the nature of the
military as an institution.108
It is of note that the PMOP oath does not begin
with words regarding their protection or service to
the citizenry of Honduras, but with the words “I am a
military professional…”
Although arguably necessary in the short term, the
privileging of the military, via FUSINA and PMOP, as
the principal tool for combating organized crime and
insecurity in the country reflects a widespread belief
among many in the military, the current government,
and also in the population at large that civilian institutions have proven themselves incapable of providing
the basic goods required by Honduras.109
Within this framework, the success of PMOP, in
conjunction with the powers conferred upon its members, such as legal detention, arguably contributes to a
pattern in which the military prefers to work with the
organization, rather than with the civilian police or
even elite forces, when conducting operations against
criminal organizations, reinforcing the tendency to
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exclude the national police from key citizen security
functions.
Another troubling aspect of the FUSINA framework is the blurred line between the positive goal of
interagency coordination and the integration of separate parts of the government in the name of efficiency,
but in a manner that subtly undermines checks and
balances between branches of government. This reduced delineation caused by the FUSINA framework
can potentially impair the due process of law for those
accused of wrongdoing. Although prosecutors and
judges supporting FUSINA technically retain their independence from the military units with which they
work, their co-location under the same military commander, and their close working relationship with
and dependence on the military units to protect and
sustain them, is a powerful if subtle inducement for
those prosecutors and judges to identify with the perspective of those conducting the operation. Indeed,
officials interviewed for this monograph, for example,
characterized one benefit of FUSINA as allowing “all
of the branches of government” to work together
against the enemy.
It is also not clear, in practical terms, when and how
law enforcement functions will be returned from the
military to the police. As noted previously, although
Plan Morazán established a timetable for the transition
back to civilian control, in January 2016, which was
supposed to have been the end of the “Domination”
phase of the plan, despite notable improvements in
public security, persisting challenges seemed to argue against moving to the “Consolidation” phase in
which control is theoretically to be returned to civilian institutions. For example, the reform of deeply
corrupted police institutions, whose dysfunctionality
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has been widely cited as an important justification
for the PMOP, is proceeding very slowly. Similarly,
in a response to a public statement by U.S. Congressman Tim Kaine following his February 2015 visit to
Honduras, President Hernandez affirmed that while
the role of the military in Honduras would be slowly
reduced as conditions permitted, there was no commitment to eliminate the PMOP.110
Relationship with the United States.
While the United States-Honduran relationship
was almost universally characterized as positive by
Honduran officials and others interviewed for this
monograph, the sometimes divergent priorities of
the two countries generate friction. On the United
States side, the Obama administration has sought to
downplay the use of military tools in its engagement
with the country. It has not substantially assisted or
engaged with the PMOP as the core security initiative of the Hernandez administration. Nor has it supported the Hernandez administration’s air shield initiative, possibly out of concern that an aircraft could
be downed with innocent passengers aboard. In April
2014, after Honduras passed its new law authorizing
aerial interceptions, the United States suspended the
providing of radar data that might be used to support
such intercepts.111
In the wake of the previously mentioned protests
and allegations against the Hernandez administration
during 2015, the United States has sought to strike
a balance between supporting the government and
acknowledging the opposition. For example, in the
official 2015 Fourth of July celebration at the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa, invitees from the Honduran
government found the embassy compound decorat56

ed with unlit torches, the same type as those which
became the national symbol for protest against the
Hernandez administration. In July 2015, when the
U.S. Senate approved funding for a Guatemalan-style
foreign juridical organization to investigate serious
crimes in the country,112 Honduran protesters took
their march against the Hernandez administration to
the U.S. Embassy, where they were received by U.S.
Ambassador James Nealon before marching on the
Honduran Presidential Palace.113
While President Hernandez is widely characterized as a conservative, pro-U.S. businessman, he is
more likely to turn away from the United States than
is commonly recognized, if he is backed into a corner.
President Hernandez comes from a difficult family
background and has succeeded through his own determination, skill, and through the help of key family
members, such as his brother Marco Agosto Hernandez, in rising first to the leadership of the Honduran
Congress, and later to the Presidency, in a cutthroat
political system. Honduran analysts consulted for this
monograph argue that while President Hernandez
recognizes the importance of the United States as an
enabler of the prosperity of the nation (and to an extent, the success of his own security plan), he arguably
does not identify with the more traditional Honduran
elites, whom he sees as having bowed to the interests
of the United States.
By contrast, President Hernandez reportedly enjoys a close personal relationship with Ecuadoran
President Rafael Correa (who himself harbors deep
personal animosity toward the United States), and
Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega. Moreover, President Hernandez’s political mentor and predecessor
in the Presidential Palace, Porfirio “Pepe” Lobo Sosa,
did his undergraduate studies in the revolutionary,
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anti-U.S. Patrice Lumumba University in the former
Soviet Union.
Such relationships and background do not make
President Hernandez anti-U.S., but serve as a caution
that, if pushed into a difficult political position by the
United States, he could turn to a more anti-U.S. populist path.
Replacing the Criminal Economy.
A growing concern is how the government’s operations against transnational organized crime impacts the people employed by them. The three sources
of employment most frequently mentioned in this
regard were:
1. the payment of local persons (principally living
in impoverished areas in the east of the country) for unloading shipments of narcotics from
boats and aircraft, and in some cases, helping to
transport it overland;
2. persons working in the estates of narcotraffickers or surrounding communities who were left
without work and living spaces when those
residences were seized; and,
3. legitimate businesses associated with the activities of persons and groups involved in criminality. The previously noted October 2015 government move against Banco Continental and its
umbrella organization, Grupo Continental (the
largest business organization in the country)
highlights the potential of the anti-crime campaign to produce unemployment and hardship
in the short term.114
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Freezing or destruction of commercial activities in
the course of going after criminal groups could have
an unintended consequence: those losing work could
turn to criminal activities themselves. While there has
been talk of compensating those put out of work by
the seizure of criminal businesses, such assistance
has traditionally not been included as part of the government plan against transnational organized crime.
Moreover, Honduran government organizations associated with economic and labor matters, which could
help address the adverse side effects of the government’s campaign against criminality, are not included
within the national security cabinet, nor in the group
of interagency players under the operational control
of FUSINA.
Urban Culture of Gangs, Violence, and Poverty.
The major urban areas of Honduras, particularly
Tegucigalpa, Comayagüela, San Pedro Sula, and to
some degree La Ceiba, have been impacted for more
than a decade by not only poverty and inequality, but
also by the culture of violent crime and gangs. Such
culture has been reinforced by the sustained emigration of Hondurans seeking employment and better
conditions in the United States and elsewhere, contributing to the absence of fathers, and in many cases
mothers as well. While the PMOP is making progress
in restoring government presence and a sense of security in some urban neighborhoods such as Flor de
Campo (as noted previously), it must contend with the
corrosive effects of a society with greatly weakened
family structures and few economic opportunities, in
which violence and crime has become the norm.
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Most people interviewed for this monograph did
not perceive social and economic development programs to be a significant portion of the interagency
security plan of the Hernandez government; yet such
programs need to be instituted at some point if the
peace achieved through the PMOP in select areas of
the country is to be sustainable.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S.
POLICYMAKERS
Adequate Level of U.S. Financial Support
for Honduras.
During the 6 years prior to the crisis spawned in
Washington D.C. in 2014 by Central American child
migrants, the United States spent a total of $600 million on Central America as a whole; yet the Obama administration was forced to commit $3.7 billion within
a matter of weeks to deal with the refugee crisis. That
crisis arguably contributed to the administration’s request of $1 billion in funding for the countries of the
northern triangle in 2016, of which approximately
$750 million was approved by the U.S. Congress in
December 2015.115 In the coming years, it is imperative
that the level of assistance to the region correspond
to its strategic importance and the potential adverse
impact on the United States if the economic and governance structures in the region were to degenerate.
Since U.S. support for Honduras should not focus
exclusively or excessively on security matters, a security assistance component that corresponds to the
relative needs and priorities of Honduras, as a U.S.
partner, is a necessary part of a holistic package for a
prosperous, stable, and democratic country.
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Prudent Engagement on Military Police and Air Interdiction.
While the United States prefers Honduras to pursue an approach to organized crime that is less reliant
on the military, the U.S. attempts to avoid supporting
Honduras in important areas of its programs against
organized crime, such as the PMOP and aerial interdiction, could undercut the success of Honduras’ security efforts, while also damaging the United StatesHonduras relationship. This lack of support could also
undercut the ability to improve the degree to which
such programs are done with maximum respect for
citizen rights and civilian safety.
Concerns over excessive militarization of law enforcement, or possible human rights abuses by the
newly formed PMOP force, should be addressed by
supporting the force in a manner that offers constructive recommendations and technical or educational
support for avoiding problems.
Similarly, with respect to air interdiction, the United States should provide support, where possible, in
the domain of radar data, intelligence, and perhaps
even support for Honduras’ aging F-5 interceptor aircraft, in conjunction with working with Honduras on
protocols and training to avoid shooting down an innocent aircraft. While not supporting activities related
to Honduras’ air interdiction program may help the
United States to keep its hands clean, active U.S. engagement with Honduras in this area may be the best
way to avoid the loss of innocent lives.
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Focus on Technology, Intelligence, and Training
Support.
Honduran experts consulted for this monograph
emphasized that the items most desired from the
United States in terms of assistance for Honduras’ security program include: police and security technology, technical intelligence support, and training in a
range of police and counter-organized crime matters.
Options for U.S. support that reflect both Honduran needs and U.S. sources of comparative advantage
include providing national technical means of intelligence support to supplement the abilities of Honduras’ new national intelligence organization, the DNII.
Other options include: law enforcement and investigative technical training to the PMOP; real time intelligence coordination for Honduras’ air and land shield
operations, as well as its maritime efforts; technology
to support Honduran anti-money laundering and financial crimes efforts; sensors to augment control of
the Guatemala border; and intelligence and special
operations training to support campaigns against the
leadership of both narcotrafficking organizations and
maras.
With respect to communications, Hondurans with
experience in patrolling the remote eastern area of the
country mentioned the need for radios permitting coordination between air, ground, and maritime assets,
as well as more and better night vision goggles.
Look for Innovative Material Solutions.
With respect to material support, Honduran experts consulted for this monograph mentioned unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as a capability that
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could save money and manpower spent on naval and
aircraft patrols in remote areas like La Mosquitia, as
well as helping them to position manned patrol and
intercept assets more effectively. They also mentioned
the need for a greater number of shallow-bottomed
craft for riverine patrols and intercept; perhaps to
include fan-powered swamp boats like those used to
navigate the everglades in the United States.
Strengthen Institutional Ties in Professional
Military Education.
To build confidence in the United States-Honduras institutional relationship, and to strengthen institutional capability in Honduras in support of its
security program, the United States should expand
scholarships for Hondurans to attend courses in U.S.
Security and Defense institutions, such as the Western Hemisphere Institute for National Security Center
(WHINSEC), the U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College.
In addition to constructing capabilities to combat
narcotrafficking and organized crime, and strengthening relationships of confidence with the United States,
the use of Latin America-oriented schoolhouses, like
WHINSEC, also facilitates bonds between Honduran
officers and those from other nations of the region,
such as Guatemala. Persons interviewed for this
monograph highlighted such ties forged in institutions, such as WHINSEC, as facilitating operational
and intelligence cooperation on the borders and in
shared maritime domains that narcotraffickers seek
to cross.
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Expand U.S. Coast Guard Ties with the Honduran
Navy.
Within the framework of providing more effective
support to the Honduran maritime shield, the United
States should explore ways to strengthen education,
training ties, and personnel exchanges between the
Honduran Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard, given that
the Coast Guard is well matched to the capabilities
and mission set of the Honduran Navy, and already
has ample experience in engaging with it on maritime
security matters.116 In an interview with Honduran naval personnel, greater interactions with the U.S. Coast
Guard were uniquely singled out as an item that could
benefit the Honduran Navy.
Work Where Possible with the Inter-American
System.
As illustrated in this monograph, narcotrafficking, gangs, and other transnational crime phenomena
are problems with sources and effects that go far beyond Honduras’ borders. The nation has nine distinct
maritime borders (two in the Pacific and seven in the
Caribbean); these borders, and unresolved differences
over them, are exploited by narcotraffickers in moving
drugs through the region. On the other hand, as noted
in the monograph, Honduras’ neighbors, particularly
Nicaragua and Colombia, are some of its most important sources of intelligence, and are key to operational
coordination in addressing the challenge.
While the importance of a multinational approach
to the challenge of organized crime in Honduras is evident, the question of which multinational approach
is also important. Honduran officials interviewed for
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this monograph noted how institutions of the InterAmerican system, such as the Conference of Central
American Armed Forces (CFAC), and the Inter-American Defense College have helped in facilitating contacts and fluid coordination between nations.
The Inter-American system is particularly relevant
in addressing Honduras’ challenges because it contains existing structures relevant to both the security
and developmental dimensions, while at the same
time including the United States, which is a key actor with respect to both the destination for narcotics
and persons transiting Honduras, as well for intelligence, interdiction, developmental support, and other
aspects of the solution.
Leverage the Central America-Dominican Republic
Free Trade Agreement for Economic Support.
As previously mentioned, the Hernandez security
concept needs a strong development component to
succeed. This would replace the money taken out of
the criminal economy by successful government actions against the narcotraffickers, create meaningful
development in urban areas to build alternatives to
desperation, and (with time) chip away at the culture
of violence and criminality in the country. In the context of such development needs, the United States has
an important vehicle in place for expanded trade and
investment in Honduras in the form of the Central
America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA-DR). Within this framework, the U.S. Department of Commerce should work more closely with
the Hernandez administration to promote expanded
U.S. investment in, and trade with, Honduras; thereby
leveraging the tax and other advantages accruing to
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businesses investing in Honduras and producing (at
least in part) for the U.S. market under CAFTA-DR,
and taking advantage of the relative proximity of
Honduras to the United States. Simultaneously, the
United States and its Honduran counterparts must
work to eliminate impediments to such investments,
including concerns by U.S. and other multinational
companies regarding security, investment protection,
infrastructure, and labor issues.
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CONCLUSION
Honduras is at a pivotal moment with respect to its
struggle against the transnational crime and insecurity that have torn the nation and its neighbors apart
during the last decade. The crisis of 60,000 unaccompanied migrant children from Central America during
the summer of 2014 illustrates that the United States
is connected to what happens in the country through
ties of geography, economic relations, and family;
thus, the United States has an important stake in the
country’s success in resolving the challenges that currently confront it.
The current Honduran approach to addressing
these security challenges is creative, intelligent, and
pragmatic, if imperfect, and it is producing positive
results. The success of the security plan of the Hernandez administration is important not only to the future
of the country and the region, but also to the United
States.
If the concept of the United States managing its relations with Latin America and the Caribbean through
a framework of mutual respect is to have any meaning, the United States must have the political courage
to help its partners in the way that they want to be
helped, taking the risk that mistakes may be made
along the way that may not paint the United States in
a positive light, but doing everything possible to make
sure that those efforts succeed.
For Honduras, Latin America, and for the Caribbean more broadly, the willingness to take such risks
is the essence of the friendship and the posture of
respect valued throughout the region.
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